risk-management-specialist

Risk Management Specialist

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Risk Management Specialist

ISO 14971:2019 risk management implementation throughout the medical device lifecycle.

Table of Contents

  • Risk Management Planning Workflow

  • Risk Analysis Workflow

  • Risk Evaluation Workflow

  • Risk Control Workflow

  • Post-Production Risk Management

  • Risk Assessment Templates

  • Decision Frameworks

  • Tools and References

Risk Management Planning Workflow

Establish risk management process per ISO 14971.

Workflow: Create Risk Management Plan

  • Define scope of risk management activities:

  • Medical device identification

  • Lifecycle stages covered

  • Applicable standards and regulations

  • Establish risk acceptability criteria:

  • Define probability categories (P1-P5)

  • Define severity categories (S1-S5)

  • Create risk matrix with acceptance thresholds

  • Assign responsibilities:

  • Risk management lead

  • Subject matter experts

  • Approval authorities

  • Define verification activities:

  • Methods for control verification

  • Acceptance criteria

  • Plan production and post-production activities:

  • Information sources

  • Review triggers

  • Update procedures

  • Obtain plan approval

  • Establish risk management file

  • Validation: Plan approved; acceptability criteria defined; responsibilities assigned; file established

Risk Management Plan Content

Section Content Evidence

Scope Device and lifecycle coverage Scope statement

Criteria Risk acceptability matrix Risk matrix document

Responsibilities Roles and authorities RACI chart

Verification Methods and acceptance Verification plan

Production/Post-Production Monitoring activities Surveillance plan

Risk Acceptability Matrix (5x5)

Probability \ Severity Negligible Minor Serious Critical Catastrophic

Frequent (P5) Medium High High Unacceptable Unacceptable

Probable (P4) Medium Medium High High Unacceptable

Occasional (P3) Low Medium Medium High High

Remote (P2) Low Low Medium Medium High

Improbable (P1) Low Low Low Medium Medium

Risk Level Actions

Level Acceptable Action Required

Low Yes Document and accept

Medium ALARP Reduce if practicable; document rationale

High ALARP Reduction required; demonstrate ALARP

Unacceptable No Design change mandatory

Risk Analysis Workflow

Identify hazards and estimate risks systematically.

Workflow: Conduct Risk Analysis

  • Define intended use and reasonably foreseeable misuse:

  • Medical indication

  • Patient population

  • User population

  • Use environment

  • Select analysis method(s):

  • FMEA for component/function analysis

  • FTA for system-level analysis

  • HAZOP for process deviations

  • Use Error Analysis for user interaction

  • Identify hazards by category:

  • Energy hazards (electrical, mechanical, thermal)

  • Biological hazards (bioburden, biocompatibility)

  • Chemical hazards (residues, leachables)

  • Operational hazards (software, use errors)

  • Determine hazardous situations:

  • Sequence of events

  • Foreseeable misuse scenarios

  • Single fault conditions

  • Estimate probability of harm (P1-P5)

  • Estimate severity of harm (S1-S5)

  • Document in hazard analysis worksheet

  • Validation: All hazard categories addressed; all hazards documented; probability and severity assigned

Hazard Categories Checklist

Category Examples Analyzed

Electrical Shock, burns, interference ☐

Mechanical Crushing, cutting, entrapment ☐

Thermal Burns, tissue damage ☐

Radiation Ionizing, non-ionizing ☐

Biological Infection, biocompatibility ☐

Chemical Toxicity, irritation ☐

Software Incorrect output, timing ☐

Use Error Misuse, perception, cognition ☐

Environment EMC, mechanical stress ☐

Analysis Method Selection

Situation Recommended Method

Component failures FMEA

System-level failure FTA

Process deviations HAZOP

User interaction Use Error Analysis

Software behavior Software FMEA

Early design phase PHA

Probability Criteria

Level Name Description Frequency

P5 Frequent Expected to occur

10⁻³

P4 Probable Likely to occur 10⁻³ to 10⁻⁴

P3 Occasional May occur 10⁻⁴ to 10⁻⁵

P2 Remote Unlikely 10⁻⁵ to 10⁻⁶

P1 Improbable Very unlikely <10⁻⁶

Severity Criteria

Level Name Description Harm

S5 Catastrophic Death Death

S4 Critical Permanent impairment Irreversible injury

S3 Serious Injury requiring intervention Reversible injury

S2 Minor Temporary discomfort No treatment needed

S1 Negligible Inconvenience No injury

See: references/risk-analysis-methods.md

Risk Evaluation Workflow

Evaluate risks against acceptability criteria.

Workflow: Evaluate Identified Risks

  • Calculate initial risk level from probability × severity

  • Compare to risk acceptability criteria

  • For each risk, determine:

  • Acceptable: Document and accept

  • ALARP: Proceed to risk control

  • Unacceptable: Mandatory risk control

  • Document evaluation rationale

  • Identify risks requiring benefit-risk analysis

  • Complete benefit-risk analysis if applicable

  • Compile risk evaluation summary

  • Validation: All risks evaluated; acceptability determined; rationale documented

Risk Evaluation Decision Tree

Risk Estimated │ ▼ Apply Acceptability Criteria │ ├── Low Risk ──────────► Accept and document │ ├── Medium Risk ───────► Consider risk reduction │ │ Document ALARP if not reduced │ ▼ │ Practicable to reduce? │ │ │ Yes──► Implement control │ No───► Document ALARP rationale │ ├── High Risk ─────────► Risk reduction required │ │ Must demonstrate ALARP │ ▼ │ Implement control │ Verify residual risk │ └── Unacceptable ──────► Design change mandatory Cannot proceed without control

ALARP Demonstration Requirements

Criterion Evidence Required

Technical feasibility Analysis of alternative controls

Proportionality Cost-benefit of further reduction

State of the art Comparison to similar devices

Stakeholder input Clinical/user perspectives

Benefit-Risk Analysis Triggers

Situation Benefit-Risk Required

Residual risk remains high Yes

No feasible risk reduction Yes

Novel device Yes

Unacceptable risk with clinical benefit Yes

All risks low No

Risk Control Workflow

Implement and verify risk control measures.

Workflow: Implement Risk Controls

  • Identify risk control options:

  • Inherent safety by design (Priority 1)

  • Protective measures in device (Priority 2)

  • Information for safety (Priority 3)

  • Select optimal control following hierarchy

  • Analyze control for new hazards introduced

  • Document control in design requirements

  • Implement control in design

  • Develop verification protocol

  • Execute verification and document results

  • Evaluate residual risk with control in place

  • Validation: Control implemented; verification passed; residual risk acceptable; no unaddressed new hazards

Risk Control Hierarchy

Priority Control Type Examples Effectiveness

1 Inherent Safety Eliminate hazard, fail-safe design Highest

2 Protective Measures Guards, alarms, automatic shutdown High

3 Information Warnings, training, IFU Lower

Risk Control Option Analysis Template

RISK CONTROL OPTION ANALYSIS

Hazard ID: H-[XXX] Hazard: [Description] Initial Risk: P[X] × S[X] = [Level]

OPTIONS CONSIDERED:

OptionControl TypeNew HazardsFeasibilitySelected
1[Type][Yes/No][H/M/L][Yes/No]
2[Type][Yes/No][H/M/L][Yes/No]

SELECTED CONTROL: Option [X] Rationale: [Justification for selection]

IMPLEMENTATION:

  • Requirement: [REQ-XXX]
  • Design Document: [Reference]

VERIFICATION:

  • Method: [Test/Analysis/Review]
  • Protocol: [Reference]
  • Acceptance Criteria: [Criteria]

Risk Control Verification Methods

Method When to Use Evidence

Test Quantifiable performance Test report

Inspection Physical presence Inspection record

Analysis Design calculation Analysis report

Review Documentation check Review record

Residual Risk Evaluation

After Control Action

Acceptable Document, proceed

ALARP achieved Document rationale, proceed

Still unacceptable Additional control or design change

New hazard introduced Analyze and control new hazard

Post-Production Risk Management

Monitor and update risk management throughout product lifecycle.

Workflow: Post-Production Risk Monitoring

  • Identify information sources:

  • Customer complaints

  • Service reports

  • Vigilance/adverse events

  • Literature monitoring

  • Clinical studies

  • Establish collection procedures

  • Define review triggers:

  • New hazard identified

  • Increased frequency of known hazard

  • Serious incident

  • Regulatory feedback

  • Analyze incoming information for risk relevance

  • Update risk management file as needed

  • Communicate significant findings

  • Conduct periodic risk management review

  • Validation: Information sources monitored; file current; reviews completed per schedule

Information Sources

Source Information Type Review Frequency

Complaints Use issues, failures Continuous

Service Field failures, repairs Monthly

Vigilance Serious incidents Immediate

Literature Similar device issues Quarterly

Regulatory Authority feedback As received

Clinical PMCF data Per plan

Risk Management File Update Triggers

Trigger Response Time Action

Serious incident Immediate Full risk review

New hazard identified 30 days Risk analysis update

Trend increase 60 days Trend analysis

Design change Before implementation Impact assessment

Standards update Per transition period Gap analysis

Periodic Review Requirements

Review Element Frequency

Risk management file completeness Annual

Risk control effectiveness Annual

Post-market information analysis Quarterly

Risk-benefit conclusions Annual or on new data

Risk Assessment Templates

Hazard Analysis Worksheet

HAZARD ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Product: [Device Name] Document: HA-[Product]-[Rev] Analyst: [Name] Date: [Date]

IDHazardHazardous SituationHarmPSInitial RiskControlResidual PResidual SFinal Risk
H-001[Hazard][Situation][Harm][1-5][1-5][Level][Control ref][1-5][1-5][Level]

FMEA Worksheet

FMEA WORKSHEET

Product: [Device Name] Subsystem: [Subsystem] Analyst: [Name] Date: [Date]

IDItemFunctionFailure ModeEffectSCauseOControlDRPNAction
FM-001[Item][Function][Mode][Effect][1-10][Cause][1-10][Detection][1-10][S×O×D][Action]

RPN Action Thresholds:

200: Critical - Immediate action 100-200: High - Action plan required 50-100: Medium - Consider action <50: Low - Monitor

Risk Management Report Summary

RISK MANAGEMENT REPORT

Product: [Device Name] Date: [Date] Revision: [X.X]

SUMMARY:

  • Total hazards identified: [N]
  • Risk controls implemented: [N]
  • Residual risks: [N] Low, [N] Medium, [N] High
  • Overall conclusion: [Acceptable / Not Acceptable]

RISK DISTRIBUTION:

Risk LevelBefore ControlAfter Control
Unacceptable[N]0
High[N][N]
Medium[N][N]
Low[N][N]

CONTROLS IMPLEMENTED:

  • Inherent safety: [N]
  • Protective measures: [N]
  • Information for safety: [N]

OVERALL RESIDUAL RISK: [Acceptable / ALARP Demonstrated] BENEFIT-RISK CONCLUSION: [If applicable]

APPROVAL: Risk Management Lead: _____________ Date: _______ Quality Assurance: _____________ Date: _______

Decision Frameworks

Risk Control Selection

What is the risk level? │ ├── Unacceptable ──► Can hazard be eliminated? │ │ │ Yes─┴─No │ │ │ │ ▼ ▼ │ Eliminate Can protective │ hazard measure reduce? │ │ │ Yes─┴─No │ │ │ │ ▼ ▼ │ Add Add warning │ protection + training │ └── High/Medium ──► Apply hierarchy starting at Level 1

New Hazard Analysis

Question If Yes If No

Does control introduce new hazard? Analyze new hazard Proceed

Is new risk higher than original? Reject control option Acceptable trade-off

Can new hazard be controlled? Add control Reject control option

Risk Acceptability Decision

Condition Decision

All risks Low Acceptable

Medium risks with ALARP Acceptable

High risks with ALARP documented Acceptable if benefits outweigh

Any Unacceptable residual Not acceptable - redesign

Tools and References

Scripts

Tool Purpose Usage

risk_matrix_calculator.py Calculate risk levels and FMEA RPN python risk_matrix_calculator.py --help

Risk Matrix Calculator Features:

  • ISO 14971 5x5 risk matrix calculation

  • FMEA RPN (Risk Priority Number) calculation

  • Interactive mode for guided assessment

  • Display risk criteria definitions

  • JSON output for integration

References

Document Content

iso14971-implementation-guide.md Complete ISO 14971:2019 implementation with templates

risk-analysis-methods.md FMEA, FTA, HAZOP, Use Error Analysis methods

Quick Reference: ISO 14971 Process

Stage Key Activities Output

Planning Define scope, criteria, responsibilities Risk Management Plan

Analysis Identify hazards, estimate risk Hazard Analysis

Evaluation Compare to criteria, ALARP assessment Risk Evaluation

Control Implement hierarchy, verify Risk Control Records

Residual Overall assessment, benefit-risk Risk Management Report

Production Monitor, review, update Updated RM File

Related Skills

Skill Integration Point

quality-manager-qms-iso13485 QMS integration

capa-officer Risk-based CAPA

regulatory-affairs-head Regulatory submissions

quality-documentation-manager Risk file management

AI-Specific Risk Management (ISO 14971 + AI Risk Considerations)

AI/ML Medical Device Risk Categories

Traditional ISO 14971 hazard categories must be extended for AI/ML-based devices:

AI-Specific Hazard Description Severity Potential Detection Difficulty

Model bias Discriminatory outputs across patient subgroups S3-S5 (misdiagnosis) High — requires subgroup analysis

Data drift Input data distribution shifts from training data S2-S4 (degraded performance) Medium — requires monitoring

Concept drift Clinical ground truth changes over time S3-S5 (outdated predictions) High — requires clinical validation

Adversarial inputs Intentionally crafted inputs to deceive model S2-S5 (incorrect output) High — requires adversarial testing

Hallucination/confabulation Plausible but incorrect outputs S3-S5 (false diagnosis) Medium — requires output validation

Training data poisoning Corrupted training data leads to systematic errors S3-S5 Very High — requires data provenance

Automation complacency Users over-trust AI outputs S3-S5 (missed clinical findings) Medium — requires human factors study

AI Risk Analysis Methodology

Step 1: AI System Characterization → Define intended use, user population, clinical context → Classify: locked algorithm vs. adaptive vs. continuously learning → Map to SaMD risk framework (IMDRF)

Step 2: AI-Specific Hazard Identification → Apply standard ISO 14971 hazard categories → ADD: data quality hazards, algorithmic hazards, integration hazards → Consider: training data representativeness, edge cases, failure modes

Step 3: AI Failure Mode Analysis → Extend FMEA with AI-specific failure modes: - False positive/negative beyond acceptable rates - Performance degradation over time - Out-of-distribution input handling - Feature importance shift → For each failure mode: determine harm pathway to patient

Step 4: AI-Specific Risk Controls → Confidence thresholds (reject uncertain predictions) → Human-in-the-loop for high-risk decisions → Input validation and out-of-distribution detection → Continuous performance monitoring with drift detection → Automated model retraining safeguards → Fail-safe modes when AI system is unavailable

Step 5: AI Risk Monitoring Plan → Define performance metrics and acceptable thresholds → Establish monitoring frequency (real-time, daily, weekly) → Define retraining triggers and validation requirements → Plan for model versioning and rollback procedures

AI Risk Acceptability Considerations

Risk Factor Additional Consideration for AI

Probability Include statistical confidence intervals for model performance

Severity Consider both direct harm and harm from delayed correct treatment

Detectability Factor in opacity of AI decision-making (explainability)

Benefit Quantify clinical benefit vs. non-AI alternative

ALARP State-of-the-art includes current AI best practices (GMLP)

Cybersecurity Risk Integration (IEC 81001-5-1)

Health Software Cybersecurity Risk Management

IEC 81001-5-1:2021 establishes cybersecurity lifecycle requirements for health software. Integrate with ISO 14971:

ISO 14971 Stage IEC 81001-5-1 Integration Combined Output

Risk Management Plan Include cybersecurity scope, threat modeling methodology Combined RM + cybersecurity plan

Hazard identification Add cybersecurity threat identification (STRIDE, attack trees) Extended hazard analysis with cyber threats

Risk estimation Estimate probability based on threat landscape and exploitability Risk register with cyber-specific likelihood factors

Risk control Implement security controls as risk mitigations Controls traceable to both safety and security risks

Residual risk Evaluate residual cybersecurity risk Combined residual risk assessment

Post-production Monitor threat landscape, CVE databases, incident reports Integrated PMS + security monitoring

Cybersecurity Threat Categories for Medical Devices

Threat Category Examples ISO 14971 Harm Pathway

Unauthorized access Credential theft, privilege escalation Modification of device settings → patient harm

Data breach PHI exfiltration, ransomware Loss of data availability → delayed treatment

Denial of service Network flooding, resource exhaustion Device unavailable → delayed diagnosis/treatment

Malware Ransomware, trojans, supply chain compromise Device malfunction → incorrect output

Data integrity Man-in-the-middle, data manipulation Corrupted clinical data → incorrect treatment

Supply chain Compromised dependencies, malicious updates Backdoor access → any harm pathway

Cybersecurity FMEA Extension

Add these columns to standard FMEA for cybersecurity failure modes:

CYBERSECURITY FMEA EXTENSION

IDComponentSecurity FunctionThreatAttack VectorExploitabilityImpactSODRPNSecurity Control
CS-001Auth moduleUser authenticationCredential theftPhishingHigh (8)Full access864192MFA + session management
CS-002Data storeData confidentialitySQL injectionNetwork inputMedium (5)Data breach943108Parameterized queries + WAF
CS-003Update mechanismIntegritySupply chainCompromised updateLow (3)Malware install1027140Code signing + integrity verification

Supply Chain Risk Management

Medical Device Supply Chain Risks

Risk Category Description Probability Impact Control Strategy

Single-source component Critical component from sole supplier Medium Critical Dual-source qualification, safety stock

Counterfeit components Fraudulent parts entering supply chain Low-Medium Catastrophic Supplier audits, incoming inspection, chain of custody

Supplier quality failure Supplier QMS breakdown Medium High Supplier qualification, periodic audits, quality agreements

Software dependency Vulnerable or unsupported open-source library High Medium-High SBOM management, vulnerability scanning, update policy

Geopolitical disruption Sanctions, trade restrictions, supply interruption Low-Medium High Geographic diversification, buffer inventory

Raw material shortage Rare earth, specialty materials unavailability Low High Alternative material qualification, forward contracts

Supply Chain Risk Assessment Workflow

Step 1: Supply Chain Mapping → Identify all direct suppliers (Tier 1) → Map critical Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers → Document component criticality (safety-critical, quality-critical, standard)

Step 2: Supplier Risk Scoring → Quality risk: past performance, certification status, audit results → Financial risk: stability, dependency on your business → Geographic risk: natural disaster, political stability → Cyber risk: supplier's information security posture → Concentration risk: single-source, regional concentration

Step 3: Risk Treatment → Critical suppliers: quality agreements, annual audits, dual-sourcing → High-risk suppliers: enhanced monitoring, contingency plans → Medium-risk suppliers: periodic review, performance metrics → Low-risk suppliers: standard purchasing controls

Step 4: Ongoing Monitoring → Supplier scorecard tracking (quality, delivery, responsiveness) → Annual supplier risk reassessment → Trigger-based reassessment (quality event, financial change, M&A)

Post-Market Risk Monitoring Automation

Automated Signal Detection

Data Source Automation Approach Alert Threshold

Complaint database Statistical process control (SPC) charts on complaint rates

2 sigma deviation from baseline

Adverse event reports NLP-based classification + trend analysis Any serious event; trend >3x baseline

Literature monitoring Automated PubMed/regulatory database searches New publication on similar device adverse events

Field service data Automated failure rate tracking Failure rate exceeds design MTBF by >20%

Social media/forums Keyword monitoring for device-related complaints Cluster of similar complaints in 30-day window

Regulatory databases MAUDE, EUDAMED vigilance module, BfArM monitoring New recall or safety communication for similar device

Risk Management File Update Automation

Automated Trigger → Risk Review Decision Tree

New complaint received → Classify by hazard category (auto or manual) → Check: Known hazard? YES → Update frequency data → Recalculate risk level → Risk level changed? → Flag for risk management review NO → New hazard identified → Initiate risk analysis → Estimate initial risk → Determine controls needed → Update risk management file

Trend threshold exceeded → Generate trend report with statistical analysis → Convene risk management review within 30 days → Update risk management file with new probability estimates → Evaluate if additional risk controls needed → If safety issue: initiate FSCA/field action assessment

Cross-Reference: NIST Cybersecurity Framework Risk Assessment

Map ISO 14971 risk management to NIST CSF 2.0 for comprehensive risk coverage:

ISO 14971 Process NIST CSF 2.0 Function Integration Point

Hazard identification Identify (ID.RA) Combine clinical and cyber threat identification

Risk estimation Identify (ID.RA-03, ID.RA-04) Unified likelihood and impact scales

Risk evaluation Identify (ID.RA-05, ID.RA-06) Single risk register with combined acceptance criteria

Risk control Protect (PR), Detect (DE) Security controls as risk mitigations

Residual risk evaluation Govern (GV.RM) Combined residual risk statement

Post-production monitoring Detect (DE.CM, DE.AE) Unified monitoring for safety and security events

See also: ../information-security-manager-iso27001/SKILL.md for ISO 27001 security controls that serve as risk mitigations.

Cross-Reference: DORA ICT Risk Management

For medical device companies operating as or supplying to financial entities in the EU, the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA, Regulation 2022/2554) adds ICT risk requirements:

DORA Requirement ISO 14971 Integration Action

ICT risk management framework (Art. 6) Extend risk management plan to include ICT risks Add ICT-specific risk categories to hazard analysis

ICT incident management (Art. 17) Align with post-production monitoring Unified incident classification and response

Digital operational resilience testing (Art. 24-27) Complement risk control verification Include penetration testing in verification activities

Third-party ICT risk (Art. 28-30) Extend supply chain risk management Assess ICT service providers per DORA requirements

Information sharing (Art. 45) Enhance post-market information sources Participate in threat intelligence sharing arrangements

Enhanced FMEA with Cybersecurity Failure Modes

Combined Safety-Security FMEA Template

COMBINED SAFETY-SECURITY FMEA

Product: [Device Name] Subsystem: [Subsystem] Date: [Date]

TRADITIONAL SAFETY FAILURE MODES:

IDItemFunctionFailure ModeEffectSCauseODetectionDRPNControl
FM-001SensorMeasure vital signIncorrect readingWrong diagnosis8Calibration drift4Self-test396Auto-calibration

CYBERSECURITY FAILURE MODES:

IDAssetSecurity ObjectiveThreatAttack VectorExploitability (O)Impact (S)Detection (D)RPNSecurity Control
CS-001Sensor dataIntegrityData manipulationMITM attack385120TLS + data signing
CS-002FirmwareIntegrityMalicious updateSupply chain2106120Secure boot + code signing
CS-003User interfaceAvailabilityDoS attackNetwork flooding564120Rate limiting + redundancy

AI/ML FAILURE MODES (if applicable):

IDComponentML FunctionFailure ModeClinical EffectSCauseODetectionDRPNML Control
AI-001ClassifierDiagnose conditionFalse negativeMissed diagnosis9Distribution shift4Performance monitoring5180Drift detection + human review
AI-002ClassifierDiagnose conditionBiased outputHealth disparity8Unrepresentative training data3Subgroup analysis6144Fairness constraints + diverse data

COMBINED RPN THRESHOLDS:

200: Critical — Immediate action required (all categories) 100-200: High — Action plan within 30 days 50-100: Medium — Monitor and consider action <50: Low — Accept and monitor

Cybersecurity-Safety Interaction Analysis

Safety Control Cybersecurity Impact Mitigation

Alarm system Alarm suppression via unauthorized access Access control + alarm integrity monitoring

Fail-safe mode Denial of service forcing perpetual safe mode Rate limiting + redundant communication

Software update Malicious update compromising safety function Code signing + dual authorization + rollback capability

Data logging Log tampering concealing safety events Append-only logs + cryptographic integrity

User authentication Lockout preventing emergency use Break-glass procedures + local override

Enhanced Risk Management — AI, Cybersecurity & Cross-Framework Integration

AI-Specific Risk Management

When managing risk for AI/ML medical devices, extend ISO 14971 with:

  • AI Model Risk: Training data bias, model drift, adversarial attacks, explainability gaps

  • Performance Degradation: Monitor for distribution shift, concept drift, and data quality issues

  • Algorithmic Bias: Demographic parity, equalized odds, calibration across subgroups

  • Human-AI Interaction Risks: Over-reliance, automation bias, alert fatigue, trust calibration

  • Cross-reference: See eu-ai-act-specialist for EU AI Act risk classification

Cybersecurity Risk Integration (IEC 81001-5-1)

  • Health Software Cybersecurity: IEC 81001-5-1 extends ISO 14971 for cybersecurity

  • Threat Modeling: STRIDE methodology applied to medical device architecture

  • Cybersecurity FMEA: Failure modes include unauthorized access, data breach, ransomware, supply chain attack

  • Vulnerability Management: CVSS scoring integrated with ISO 14971 severity/probability matrix

  • Cross-reference: See infrastructure-compliance-auditor for technical security checks

Supply Chain Risk Management

  • Component Risk: Third-party software vulnerabilities (SBOM-based assessment)

  • Supplier Risk: Single-source dependencies, geopolitical risks, quality history

  • Cloud Risk: Data residency, service availability, vendor lock-in

  • Cross-reference: See nis2-directive-specialist for NIS2 supply chain requirements

Cross-Framework Risk Mapping

Risk Area ISO 14971 NIST CSF 2.0 DORA NIS2

Risk Assessment Clause 4 ID.RA Art. 6 Art. 21.1

Risk Treatment Clause 7 PR (all) Art. 9 Art. 21.2

Monitoring Clause 9 DE.CM Art. 10 Art. 21.2.f

Incident Response Clause 9 RS.MA Art. 17 Art. 23

Continuous Improvement Clause 10 ID.IM Art. 13 Art. 21.2.f

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