Philosophy of Language Skill
Master the philosophical study of language: How do words mean? How does reference work? What is truth?
Core Questions
Question Issue
How do words mean? Theory of meaning
How do names refer? Reference theory
What is truth? Truth theories
What do we do with words? Speech act theory
Theories of Meaning
Frege: Sense and Reference
FREGEAN SEMANTICS ═════════════════
REFERENCE (Bedeutung) ├── What expression picks out ├── "Venus" refers to Venus └── Compositional: Reference of whole from parts
SENSE (Sinn) ├── Mode of presentation ├── Cognitive significance ├── "Morning star" vs. "Evening star" └── Same reference, different sense
WHY BOTH? ├── "Hesperus = Phosphorus" is informative ├── "Hesperus = Hesperus" is trivial ├── Same reference, different sense └── Sense determines reference
Russell: Descriptions
The Problem: "The present King of France is bald"
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No King of France exists
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What does the sentence mean?
Russell's Analysis:
"The F is G" = ∃x(Fx ∧ ∀y(Fy → y=x) ∧ Gx)
"There is exactly one F, and it is G"
Not a referring expression but a quantified claim False (not meaningless) because no unique F exists
Direct Reference
Kripke's Revolution:
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Names are rigid designators
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Refer to same thing in all possible worlds
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Not abbreviated descriptions
KRIPKE'S ARGUMENTS ══════════════════
MODAL ARGUMENT: "Aristotle might not have been a philosopher" ├── Makes sense ├── But "The teacher of Alexander might not have taught Alexander" │ └── Would make Aristotle not Aristotle └── Names ≠ descriptions
EPISTEMIC ARGUMENT: We can discover "Hesperus = Phosphorus" ├── A posteriori necessary truth ├── Same thing in all worlds └── But discovered, not known a priori
SEMANTIC ARGUMENT: Reference is causal-historical ├── Not by fitting description ├── Baptism + chain of communication └── Name-using practice
Meaning and Use
Wittgenstein: Meaning as Use
Early: Meaning is picturing reality Later: "Meaning is use in a language game"
Language Games:
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Meaning depends on context, rules, practice
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No single essence to "meaning"
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Family resemblance
Private Language Argument:
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No purely private meanings
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Rule-following requires community
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Meaning is public
Speech Act Theory (Austin, Searle)
SPEECH ACT THEORY ═════════════════
THREE TYPES OF ACTS:
LOCUTIONARY ├── Saying something with meaning └── Uttering words with sense and reference
ILLOCUTIONARY ├── What you do in saying it ├── Promising, warning, asserting └── Force of the utterance
PERLOCUTIONARY ├── Effect on hearer ├── Persuading, frightening, amusing └── Consequences of saying
FELICITY CONDITIONS: ├── Preparatory: Appropriate circumstances ├── Sincerity: Speaker means it ├── Essential: Counts as the act └── Infelicity: Act fails (not false, but unhappy)
Reference and Names
Descriptivist Theory
Frege/Russell: Names = disguised descriptions
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"Aristotle" = "The teacher of Alexander" (or cluster)
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Reference determined by satisfying description
Problems (Kripke):
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Modal: Could have failed to satisfy description
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Epistemic: Can discover identity
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Semantic: Reference even with false beliefs
Causal-Historical Theory
Kripke/Putnam:
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Initial baptism fixes reference
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Reference transmitted through causal chain
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Community-based reference
Natural Kind Terms
Putnam's Twin Earth:
TWIN EARTH ══════════
Scenario: ├── Twin Earth exactly like Earth ├── Except "water" is XYZ, not H₂O ├── XYZ phenomenally identical to H₂O └── 1750: No one knows difference
Question: Does "water" mean the same?
Putnam: No! ├── "Water" on Earth refers to H₂O ├── "Water" on Twin Earth refers to XYZ ├── "Meanings ain't in the head" └── Natural kind terms refer to natural kinds
Truth
Correspondence Theory
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Truth = correspondence to facts
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"Snow is white" is true iff snow is white
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Problems: What are facts? What is correspondence?
Coherence Theory
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Truth = coherence with other beliefs
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System of beliefs that hangs together
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Problems: Coherent fictions?
Pragmatic Theory
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Truth = what works
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Useful beliefs are true
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Problems: Useful ≠ true
Deflationism
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"True" is just a device for endorsement
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"Snow is white" is true = Snow is white
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No substantial property
Tarski's Semantic Theory
TARSKIAN TRUTH ══════════════
T-SCHEMA: "S" is true iff S
EXAMPLE: "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white
Requirements: ├── Object language (mentioned) ├── Metalanguage (used) ├── Hierarchy avoids liar paradox └── Truth defined for formal languages
Context and Indexicals
Indexicals
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"I", "here", "now", "this"
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Reference depends on context of utterance
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Kaplan: Character vs. Content
KAPLAN'S THEORY ═══════════════
CHARACTER ├── Rule for determining reference ├── "I" = speaker of context └── Constant across contexts
CONTENT ├── What's said in context ├── "I am tired" said by me └── Proposition about me
Contextualism
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Meaning of many expressions context-dependent
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Not just indexicals
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"Knows", "tall", "ready"
Key Vocabulary
Term Meaning
Sense Mode of presentation
Reference What expression picks out
Rigid designator Same reference in all worlds
Indexical Context-dependent expression
Proposition What is said, content
Speech act Action performed in speaking
Illocutionary force Type of speech act
Compositionality Meaning of whole from parts
Use theory Meaning is use
Direct reference Names refer without sense
Integration with Repository
Related Skills
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analytic-philosophy : Core tradition
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logic : Formal semantics
Related Themes
- thoughts/knowledge/ : Language and thought