File Upload Security (UPLD)

Analyze source code for file upload vulnerabilities including client-only validation, missing content-type verification, no magic byte checking, path traversal in filenames, upload to webroot with execution, and zip slip (archive extraction path traversal). Insecure file uploads can lead to remote code execution, denial of service, and data exfiltration.

Supported Flags

Read ../../shared/schemas/flags.md for the full flag specification. This skill supports all cross-cutting flags. Key flags for this skill:

• --scope determines which files to analyze (default: changed )

• --depth standard reads code and checks upload handlers

• --depth deep traces file paths from upload through storage to serving

• --severity filters output (upload issues are often critical or high )

Framework Context

Key CWEs in scope:

• CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

• CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory

• CWE-79: Cross-Site Scripting (via uploaded HTML/SVG)

• CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (via file size)

• CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference (via uploaded XML)

Detection Patterns

Read references/detection-patterns.md for the full catalog of code patterns, search heuristics, language-specific examples, and false positive guidance.

Workflow

1. Determine Scope

Parse flags and resolve the file list per ../../shared/schemas/flags.md . Filter to files likely to contain upload logic:

• Upload handlers (/upload/ , /uploads/ , /attachments/ )

• File processing (/files/ , /media/ , /storage/ )

• Multipart form handling (/middleware/ , /controllers/ )

• Archive extraction (/extract/ , /unzip/ , /import/ )

• Frontend validation (/components/ , /views/ )

2. Check for Available Scanners

Detect scanners per ../../shared/schemas/scanners.md :

• semgrep -- primary scanner for upload patterns

• bandit -- Python file handling issues

• brakeman -- Rails file upload vulnerabilities

Record which scanners are available and which are missing.

3. Run Scanners (If Available)

If semgrep is available, run with rules targeting upload security:

semgrep scan --config auto --json --quiet <target>

Filter results to rules matching file upload, path traversal, and content-type patterns. Normalize output to the findings schema.

4. Claude Code Analysis

Regardless of scanner availability, perform manual code analysis:

• Client-only validation: Find client-side file type checks (HTML accept

attribute, JavaScript validation) without corresponding server-side checks.

• Content-type verification: Check upload handlers verify Content-Type against an allowlist and do not trust the client-provided value alone.

• Magic byte validation: Verify upload handlers check file magic bytes (file signatures) to confirm the file type matches the claimed type.

• Path traversal in filename: Find places where the original filename is used in file path construction without sanitization.

• Upload to webroot: Check whether uploaded files are stored in web-accessible directories where they could be executed.

• Archive extraction: Find zip/tar extraction code and verify paths are validated to prevent directory traversal (zip slip).

When --depth deep , additionally trace:

• Full file path from upload to storage to serving

• File serving configuration (static file handlers, CDN configuration)

• Archive extraction to final storage location

5. Report Findings

Format output per ../../shared/schemas/findings.md using the UPLD prefix (e.g., UPLD-001 , UPLD-002 ).

Include for each finding:

• Severity and confidence

• Exact file location with code snippet

• Attack scenario (what malicious file could achieve)

• Concrete fix with diff when possible

• CWE and OWASP references

What to Look For

These are the high-signal patterns specific to file upload security. Each maps to a detection pattern in references/detection-patterns.md .

Client-only file type validation -- HTML accept attribute or JavaScript checks without server-side enforcement.

Missing content-type verification -- Upload handler accepts any file type or trusts the client-provided Content-Type header.

No magic byte validation -- File type determined solely by extension or Content-Type, not by reading the file header bytes.

Path traversal in filename -- Original filename used in path construction (e.g., ../../../etc/passwd ) without sanitization.

Upload to executable directory -- Files stored in webroot where a server could execute uploaded scripts (.php , .jsp , .py ).

Zip slip vulnerability -- Archive extraction writes files outside the intended directory via ../ entries in archive member paths.

Missing file size limit -- No server-side limit on upload size, enabling denial of service via large files.

Dangerous file types allowed -- No blocklist for executable file types (.exe , .sh , .php , .jsp , .py ).

Scanner Integration

Scanner Coverage Command

semgrep Path traversal, unrestricted upload, zip slip semgrep scan --config auto --json --quiet <target>

bandit Python file handling, path traversal bandit -r <target> -f json -q

brakeman Rails file upload, content type brakeman -q -f json -o /dev/stdout

Fallback (no scanner): Use Grep with patterns from references/detection-patterns.md

to find upload handlers, filename usage, archive extraction, and content-type checks. Report findings with confidence: medium .

Output Format

Use the findings schema from ../../shared/schemas/findings.md .

• ID prefix: UPLD (e.g., UPLD-001 )

• metadata.tool: file-upload

• metadata.framework: specialized

• metadata.category: UPLD

• references.cwe: CWE-434 , CWE-22

• references.owasp: A04:2021 (Insecure Design)

• references.stride: T (Tampering) or E (Elevation of Privilege)

Severity guidance for this category:

• critical: Upload to webroot with execution, zip slip to sensitive directories, no validation at all

• high: Missing server-side type validation, path traversal in filename, dangerous types allowed

• medium: Client-only validation, missing magic bytes check, no file size limit

• low: Overly permissive allowlist, missing secondary validation layer