Network Policy Management
Architecture Quick Reference
All cluster traffic is implicitly denied via Cilium baseline CCNPs. Two layers control access:
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Baselines (cluster-wide CCNPs): DNS egress, health probes, Prometheus scrape, opt-in kube-API
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Profiles (per-namespace via label): Ingress/egress rules matched by network-policy.homelab/profile=<value>
Platform namespaces (kube-system , monitoring , database , etc.) use hand-crafted CNPs — never apply profiles to them.
Workflow: Deploy App with Network Policy
Step 1: Choose a Profile
Profile Ingress Egress Use Case
isolated
None DNS only Batch jobs, workers
internal
Internal gateway DNS only Internal dashboards
internal-egress
Internal gateway DNS + HTTPS Internal apps calling external APIs
standard
Both gateways DNS + HTTPS Public-facing web apps
Decision tree:
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Does the app need to be reached from the internet? -> standard
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Internal-only but needs to call external APIs? -> internal-egress
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Internal-only, no external calls? -> internal
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No ingress needed at all? -> isolated
Step 2: Apply Profile Label to Namespace
In the namespace YAML (committed to git, not kubectl apply ):
apiVersion: v1 kind: Namespace metadata: name: my-app labels: network-policy.homelab/profile: standard
Step 3: Add Shared Resource Access Labels
If the app needs database, cache, or S3 access, add access labels to the namespace:
labels: network-policy.homelab/profile: standard access.network-policy.homelab/postgres: "true" # PostgreSQL (port 5432) access.network-policy.homelab/dragonfly: "true" # Dragonfly/Redis (port 6379) access.network-policy.homelab/garage-s3: "true" # Garage S3 (port 3900) access.network-policy.homelab/kube-api: "true" # Kubernetes API (port 6443)
Step 4: Verify Connectivity
After deployment, check for dropped traffic:
hubble observe --verdict DROPPED --namespace my-app --since 5m
If drops appear, see the Debugging section below.
Workflow: Debug Blocked Traffic
Step 1: Identify Drops
All drops in a namespace
hubble observe --verdict DROPPED --namespace my-app --since 5m
With source/destination details
hubble observe --verdict DROPPED --namespace my-app --since 5m -o json |
jq '{src: .source.namespace + "/" + .source.pod_name, dst: .destination.namespace + "/" + .destination.pod_name, port: (.l4.TCP.destination_port // .l4.UDP.destination_port)}'
Step 2: Classify the Drop
Drop Pattern Likely Cause Fix
Egress to kube-system:53 dropped Missing DNS baseline Should not happen — check if baseline CCNP exists
Egress to database:5432 dropped Missing postgres access label Add access.network-policy.homelab/postgres=true
Egress to database:6379 dropped Missing dragonfly access label Add access.network-policy.homelab/dragonfly=true
Egress to internet :443 dropped Profile doesn't allow HTTPS egress Switch to internal-egress or standard
Ingress from istio-gateway dropped Profile doesn't allow gateway ingress Switch to internal , internal-egress , or standard
Ingress from monitoring:prometheus dropped Missing baseline Should not happen — check baseline CCNP
Step 3: Verify Specific Flows
DNS resolution
hubble observe --namespace my-app --protocol UDP --port 53 --since 5m
Database connectivity
hubble observe --namespace my-app --to-namespace database --port 5432 --since 5m
Internet egress
hubble observe --namespace my-app --to-identity world --port 443 --since 5m
Gateway ingress
hubble observe --from-namespace istio-gateway --to-namespace my-app --since 5m
Prometheus scraping
hubble observe --from-namespace monitoring --to-namespace my-app --since 5m
Step 4: Check Policy Status
List all policies affecting a namespace
kubectl get cnp -n my-app kubectl get ccnp | grep -E 'baseline|profile'
Check which profile is active
kubectl get namespace my-app --show-labels | grep network-policy
Workflow: Emergency Escape Hatch
Use only when network policies block legitimate traffic and you need immediate relief.
Step 1: Disable Enforcement
kubectl label namespace <ns> network-policy.homelab/enforcement=disabled
This triggers alerts:
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NetworkPolicyEnforcementDisabled (warning) after 5 minutes
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NetworkPolicyEnforcementDisabledLong (critical) after 24 hours
Step 2: Verify Traffic Flows
hubble observe --namespace <ns> --since 1m
Step 3: Investigate Root Cause
Use the debugging workflow above to identify what policy is missing or misconfigured.
Step 4: Fix the Policy (via GitOps)
Apply the fix through a PR — never kubectl apply directly.
Step 5: Re-enable Enforcement
kubectl label namespace <ns> network-policy.homelab/enforcement-
See docs/runbooks/network-policy-escape-hatch.md for the full procedure.
Workflow: Add Platform Namespace CNP
Platform namespaces need hand-crafted CNPs (not profiles). Create in kubernetes/platform/config/network-policy/platform/ .
Required Rules
Every platform CNP must include:
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DNS egress to kube-system/kube-dns (port 53 UDP/TCP)
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Prometheus scrape ingress from monitoring namespace
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Health probe ingress from health entity and 169.254.0.0/16
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HBONE rules if namespace participates in Istio mesh (port 15008 to/from istio-system/ztunnel )
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Service-specific rules for the namespace's actual traffic patterns
Template
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2 kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy metadata: name: <namespace>-default namespace: <namespace> spec: description: "<Namespace purpose>: describe allowed traffic" endpointSelector: {} ingress: # Health probes - fromEntities: [health] - fromCIDR: ["169.254.0.0/16"] # Prometheus scraping - fromEndpoints: - matchLabels: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: monitoring app.kubernetes.io/name: prometheus toPorts: - ports: - port: "<metrics-port>" protocol: TCP # HBONE (if mesh participant) - fromEndpoints: - matchLabels: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: istio-system app: ztunnel toPorts: - ports: - port: "15008" protocol: TCP egress: # DNS - toEndpoints: - matchLabels: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: kube-system k8s-app: kube-dns toPorts: - ports: - port: "53" protocol: UDP - port: "53" protocol: TCP # HBONE (if mesh participant) - toEndpoints: - matchLabels: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: istio-system app: ztunnel toPorts: - ports: - port: "15008" protocol: TCP
After creating, add to kubernetes/platform/config/network-policy/platform/kustomization.yaml .
Anti-Patterns
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NEVER create explicit default-deny policies — baselines provide implicit deny
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NEVER use profiles for platform namespaces — they need custom CNPs
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NEVER hardcode IP addresses — use endpoint selectors and entities
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NEVER allow any port — always specify explicit port lists
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NEVER disable enforcement without following the escape hatch runbook
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NEVER apply network policy changes via kubectl on integration/live — always through GitOps
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Dev cluster exception: Direct kubectl apply of network policies is permitted on dev for testing
Cross-References
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network-policy/CLAUDE.md — Full architecture and directory structure
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docs/runbooks/network-policy-escape-hatch.md — Emergency bypass procedure
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docs/runbooks/network-policy-verification.md — Hubble verification commands