Code Security Scanner

Scan code repositories for malicious behavior: data theft, backdoors, code injection, supply-chain attacks, and sensitive file access. Optimized for TypeScript/JavaScript/Node.js but applicable to general codebases.

Security Auditor Mindset

Before scanning, think like an attacker:

• Motivation: What valuable data exists in this project? (API keys, user data, financial info, cloud credentials)
• Attack Surface: What are the entry points? (npm install lifecycle, runtime execution, build pipeline, CI/CD)
• Stealth: How would an attacker hide malicious code? (obfuscation, delayed execution via setTimeout, legitimate-looking variable names, deeply nested dependencies)
• Exfil Path: How would stolen data leave? (HTTP POST, DNS queries, WebSocket, embedded in error logs, encoded in image metadata)

Ask yourself: "If I were a malicious actor with commit access or supply-chain control, where would I hide code and how would I avoid detection?"

Severity Triage Principle

Not all findings are equal. Prioritize by blast radius × stealth:

Core Workflow

Step 1: Determine Scan Scope

Identify the project structure before scanning:

1. Locate package.json, tsconfig.json, .npmrc, lockfiles (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml)
2. Identify entry points: main, scripts, bin fields in package.json
3. List all preinstall/postinstall/prepare lifecycle scripts
4. Note any .env, .env.*, or config files containing potential secrets
5. Check if monorepo — scan all packages/*/package.json if workspaces field exists

For non-npm projects (Deno, Bun, or plain scripts): Skip dependency analysis and focus on code pattern scanning (Phases 1-3, 5).

Step 2: Load Detection Rules

Load the reference file(s) matching the scan type:

IMPORTANT: For targeted scans, load ONLY the relevant reference. Do NOT load all 5 references for a focused request — this wastes context and dilutes attention.

Step 3: Execute Scan

Scan in severity order — Critical (🔴) first, then Medium (🟡):

🔴 Phase 1: Data Exfiltration Detection

MANDATORY: Read references/data-exfiltration.md for grep patterns.

Search for patterns that send sensitive data to external servers.

Key signals:

• HTTP requests containing process.env, API keys, or tokens in the body/headers
• Hardcoded URLs receiving environment variable data
• Base64-encoded destination URLs
• DNS-based exfiltration patterns

🔴 Phase 2: Backdoor Detection

MANDATORY: Read references/backdoor-detection.md for grep patterns.

Search for hidden network listeners and remote access.

Key signals:

• net.createServer / http.createServer on unusual ports
• child_process spawning shells with network arguments
• Hidden Express/Koa/Fastify routes not documented in API specs
• WebSocket connections to hardcoded external hosts

🔴 Phase 3: Malicious Code Injection

MANDATORY: Read references/malicious-code-patterns.md for grep patterns.

Search for dynamic code execution and obfuscation.

Key signals:

• eval(), new Function(), vm.runInNewContext()
• Strings assembled character-by-character then executed
• Buffer.from(..., 'base64') followed by eval or exec
• postinstall / preinstall scripts running network requests or shell commands

🟡 Phase 4: Dependency Chain Risks

MANDATORY: Read references/dependency-risks.md for analysis patterns.

Analyze dependencies for supply-chain attack indicators.

Key signals:

• Typosquatting package names (e.g., lodahs instead of lodash)
• Packages with postinstall hooks that download/execute remote code
• Unpinned versions (*, latest) or very recent publications

Fallbacks for different package managers:

🟡 Phase 5: Sensitive File Access

MANDATORY: Read references/filesystem-risks.md for grep patterns.

Search for code reading sensitive local files.

Key signals:

• Reading ~/.ssh/, ~/.aws/, ~/.gnupg/
• Accessing browser profile directories or cookie stores
• Reading .env files outside the project root
• OS keychain or credential manager access

Step 4: Generate Security Report

Produce a structured report:

# Security Scan Report — [Project Name]

## Summary
- **Scan Date**: [date]
- **Files Scanned**: [count]
- **Critical Findings**: [count]
- **Medium Findings**: [count]

## 🔴 Critical Findings
### [Finding Title]
- **Category**: [Data Exfiltration | Backdoor | Malicious Code]
- **File**: `path/to/file.ts:line`
- **Code**: [offending code snippet]
- **Risk**: [what could happen]
- **Recommendation**: [how to fix]

## 🟡 Medium Findings
### [Finding Title]
- **Category**: [Dependency Risk | Filesystem Risk]
- **File**: `path/to/file.ts:line`
- **Risk**: [description]
- **Recommendation**: [action]

## ✅ Passed Checks
[List categories that passed with no findings]

Anti-Patterns (Common False Positives)

NEVER flag these without checking context first. Doing so floods the report with noise and erodes trust.

1. Legitimate eval() — Template engines (EJS, Handlebars), REPL tools, and test frameworks may use eval. Flag ONLY when it processes external/user input or fetched data.
2. Build scripts with child_process — Common in build tools (webpack plugins, gulp tasks). Only flag when combined with network operations or env var exfiltration.
3. HTTP requests in test files — Mock servers and test utilities commonly use net.createServer. Deprioritize **/*.test.*, **/*.spec.*, and __tests__/ directories.
4. Env var access in config loaders — Libraries like dotenv, convict, config legitimately read .env files. Flag only when env values are sent to non-project endpoints.
5. Minified/bundled vendor files — dist/, vendor/, *.min.js, *.bundle.js contain obfuscated code by design. Skip UNLESS recently modified (check git log timestamp) or the project doesn't use a bundler.
6. Crypto libraries — Legitimate use of crypto, bcrypt, argon2, jose, Base64 encoding for JWT. Flag ONLY when combined with network calls to non-standard endpoints.
7. Code generators and AST tools — Babel plugins, TypeScript compiler extensions, ESLint custom rules, and Prettier plugins legitimately use eval-like constructs and dynamic require(). Check the package purpose.
8. CI/CD and dev tooling postinstall — husky, patch-package, electron-builder, node-gyp use legitimate postinstall hooks. Prioritize scanning dependencies over devDependencies. Flag devDependencies only if they download from suspicious URLs.
9. Monorepo workspace scripts — Tools like Turborepo, Lerna, and Nx run child_process.exec across workspace packages. This is expected infrastructure, not a backdoor.
10. SSH libraries in deployment tools — Packages like node-ssh, ssh2 are legitimate in deployment/provisioning tools. Flag only in libraries/packages that shouldn't need remote access.

The Context Rule

Before escalating any finding to 🔴 Critical, verify: "Does this code run in production, AND does it touch sensitive data, AND does it communicate externally?" All three must be true for a genuine critical finding.