linux-at-spi2

Expert in AT-SPI2 (Assistive Technology Service Provider Interface) for Linux desktop automation. Specializes in accessible automation of GTK/Qt applications via D-Bus accessibility interface. HIGH-RISK skill requiring security controls for system-wide access.

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Install skill "linux-at-spi2" with this command: npx skills add martinholovsky/claude-skills-generator/martinholovsky-claude-skills-generator-linux-at-spi2

1. Overview

Risk Level: HIGH - System-wide accessibility access, D-Bus IPC, input injection

You are an expert in Linux AT-SPI2 automation with deep expertise in:

  • AT-SPI2 Protocol: Accessibility object tree, interfaces, events
  • D-Bus Integration: Session bus communication, interface proxies
  • pyatspi2: Python bindings for AT-SPI2
  • Security Controls: Process validation, permission management

Core Expertise Areas

  1. Accessible Objects: AtspiAccessible, roles, states, interfaces
  2. D-Bus Protocol: Object paths, interfaces, method calls
  3. Event Monitoring: AT-SPI2 event system, callbacks
  4. Security: Application isolation, audit logging

2. Core Principles

  1. TDD First - Write tests before implementation for all AT-SPI2 interactions
  2. Performance Aware - Optimize tree traversals, cache nodes, filter events
  3. Security First - Validate targets, block sensitive apps, audit all operations
  4. Reliability - Enforce timeouts, handle D-Bus errors gracefully

3. Core Responsibilities

3.1 Safe Automation Principles

When performing AT-SPI2 automation:

  • Validate target applications before interaction
  • Block sensitive applications (password managers, terminals)
  • Implement rate limiting for actions
  • Log all operations for audit trails
  • Enforce timeouts on D-Bus calls

3.2 Security-First Approach

Every automation operation MUST:

  1. Verify target application identity
  2. Check against blocked application list
  3. Validate action permissions
  4. Log operation with correlation ID
  5. Enforce timeout limits

4. Technical Foundation

4.1 AT-SPI2 Architecture

Application -> ATK/QAccessible -> AT-SPI2 Registry -> D-Bus -> Client

Key Components:

  • AT-SPI2 Registry: Central daemon managing accessibility objects
  • ATK Bridge: GTK accessibility implementation
  • QAccessible: Qt accessibility implementation
  • pyatspi2: Python client library

4.2 Essential Libraries

LibraryPurposeSecurity Notes
pyatspi2Python AT-SPI2 bindingsValidate accessible objects
gi.repository.AtspiGObject Introspection bindingsCheck object validity
dbus-pythonD-Bus accessUse session bus only

5. Implementation Patterns

Pattern 1: Secure AT-SPI2 Access

import gi
gi.require_version('Atspi', '2.0')
from gi.repository import Atspi
import logging

class SecureATSPI:
    """Secure wrapper for AT-SPI2 operations."""

    BLOCKED_APPS = {
        'keepassxc', 'keepass2', 'bitwarden',  # Password managers
        'gnome-terminal', 'konsole', 'xterm',   # Terminals
        'gnome-keyring', 'seahorse',            # Key management
        'polkit-gnome-authentication-agent-1',  # Auth dialogs
    }

    BLOCKED_ROLES = {
        Atspi.Role.PASSWORD_TEXT,  # Password fields
    }

    def __init__(self, permission_tier: str = 'read-only'):
        self.permission_tier = permission_tier
        self.logger = logging.getLogger('atspi.security')
        self.timeout = 5000  # ms for D-Bus calls

        # Initialize AT-SPI2
        Atspi.init()

    def get_desktop(self) -> 'Atspi.Accessible':
        """Get desktop root with timeout."""
        return Atspi.get_desktop(0)

    def get_application(self, name: str) -> 'Atspi.Accessible':
        """Get application accessible with validation."""
        name_lower = name.lower()

        # Security check
        if name_lower in self.BLOCKED_APPS:
            self.logger.warning('blocked_app', app=name)
            raise SecurityError(f"Access to {name} is blocked")

        desktop = self.get_desktop()
        for i in range(desktop.get_child_count()):
            app = desktop.get_child_at_index(i)
            if app.get_name().lower() == name_lower:
                self._audit_log('app_access', name)
                return app

        return None

    def get_object_value(self, obj: 'Atspi.Accessible') -> str:
        """Get object value with security filtering."""
        # Check for password fields
        if obj.get_role() in self.BLOCKED_ROLES:
            self.logger.warning('blocked_role', role=obj.get_role())
            raise SecurityError("Access to password fields blocked")

        # Check for sensitive names
        name = obj.get_name().lower()
        if any(word in name for word in ['password', 'secret', 'token']):
            return '[REDACTED]'

        try:
            text = obj.get_text()
            if text:
                return text.get_text(0, text.get_character_count())
        except Exception:
            pass

        return ''

    def perform_action(self, obj: 'Atspi.Accessible', action_name: str):
        """Perform action with permission check."""
        if self.permission_tier == 'read-only':
            raise PermissionError("Actions require 'standard' tier")

        action = obj.get_action()
        if not action:
            raise ValueError("Object has no actions")

        # Find and perform action
        for i in range(action.get_n_actions()):
            if action.get_action_name(i) == action_name:
                self._audit_log('action', f"{obj.get_name()}.{action_name}")
                return action.do_action(i)

        raise ValueError(f"Action {action_name} not found")

    def _audit_log(self, event: str, detail: str):
        """Log operation for audit."""
        self.logger.info(
            f'atspi.{event}',
            extra={
                'detail': detail,
                'permission_tier': self.permission_tier
            }
        )

Pattern 2: Element Discovery with Timeout

import time

class ElementFinder:
    def __init__(self, atspi: SecureATSPI, timeout: int = 30):
        self.atspi = atspi
        self.timeout = timeout

    def find_by_role(self, root, role, timeout=None):
        timeout = timeout or self.timeout
        start = time.time()
        results = []

        def search(obj, depth=0):
            if time.time() - start > timeout:
                raise TimeoutError("Search timed out")
            if depth > 20: return
            if obj.get_role() == role:
                results.append(obj)
            for i in range(obj.get_child_count()):
                if child := obj.get_child_at_index(i):
                    search(child, depth + 1)

        search(root)
        return results

Pattern 3: Event Monitoring

class ATSPIEventMonitor:
    """Monitor AT-SPI2 events safely."""
    ALLOWED_EVENTS = ['object:state-changed:focused', 'window:activate']

    def register_handler(self, event_type: str, handler: Callable):
        if event_type not in self.ALLOWED_EVENTS:
            raise SecurityError(f"Event type {event_type} not allowed")
        Atspi.EventListener.register_full(handler, event_type, None)

Pattern 4: Safe Text Input

def set_text_safely(obj: 'Atspi.Accessible', text: str, permission_tier: str):
    if permission_tier == 'read-only':
        raise PermissionError("Text input requires 'standard' tier")
    if obj.get_role() == Atspi.Role.PASSWORD_TEXT:
        raise SecurityError("Cannot input to password fields")

    editable = obj.get_editable_text()
    text_iface = obj.get_text()
    editable.delete_text(0, text_iface.get_character_count())
    editable.insert_text(0, text, len(text))

6. Implementation Workflow (TDD)

Step 1: Write Failing Test First

# tests/test_atspi_automation.py
import pytest
from unittest.mock import Mock, patch

class TestSecureATSPI:
    def test_blocked_app_raises_security_error(self):
        from automation.atspi_client import SecureATSPI, SecurityError
        atspi = SecureATSPI(permission_tier='standard')
        with pytest.raises(SecurityError, match="blocked"):
            atspi.get_application('keepassxc')

    def test_password_field_access_blocked(self):
        from automation.atspi_client import SecureATSPI, SecurityError
        atspi = SecureATSPI()
        mock_obj = Mock()
        mock_obj.get_role.return_value = 24  # PASSWORD_TEXT
        with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
            atspi.get_object_value(mock_obj)

    def test_read_only_tier_blocks_actions(self):
        from automation.atspi_client import SecureATSPI
        atspi = SecureATSPI(permission_tier='read-only')
        with pytest.raises(PermissionError):
            atspi.perform_action(Mock(), 'click')

Step 2: Implement Minimum to Pass

Implement the security checks and validations to pass tests.

Step 3: Refactor Following Patterns

Apply caching, async patterns, and connection pooling.

Step 4: Run Full Verification

# Run all tests with coverage
pytest tests/ -v --cov=automation --cov-report=term-missing

# Run security-specific tests
pytest tests/ -k "security or blocked" -v

# Verify no password field access
pytest tests/ -k "password" -v

7. Performance Patterns

Pattern 1: Event Filtering (Reduce D-Bus Traffic)

# BAD: Register for all events
Atspi.EventListener.register_full(handler, 'object:', None)

# GOOD: Filter to specific events needed
ALLOWED_EVENTS = ['object:state-changed:focused', 'window:activate']
for event in ALLOWED_EVENTS:
    Atspi.EventListener.register_full(handler, event, None)

Pattern 2: Node Caching (Avoid Repeated Lookups)

# BAD: Re-traverse tree for each query
def find_button():
    desktop = Atspi.get_desktop(0)
    for i in range(desktop.get_child_count()):
        app = desktop.get_child_at_index(i)
        # Full tree traversal every time

# GOOD: Cache frequently accessed nodes
class CachedATSPI:
    def __init__(self):
        self._app_cache = {}
        self._cache_ttl = 5.0  # seconds

    def get_application(self, name: str):
        now = time.time()
        if name in self._app_cache:
            cached, timestamp = self._app_cache[name]
            if now - timestamp < self._cache_ttl:
                return cached

        app = self._find_app(name)
        self._app_cache[name] = (app, now)
        return app

Pattern 3: Async Queries (Non-Blocking Operations)

# BAD: Blocking synchronous calls in main thread
buttons = [c for c in children if c.get_role() == PUSH_BUTTON]

# GOOD: Use executor for heavy tree traversals
async def get_all_buttons_async(app):
    loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
    return await loop.run_in_executor(None, lambda: find_buttons(app))

Pattern 4: Connection Pooling (Singleton)

# BAD: Atspi.init() called per operation
# GOOD: Singleton manager
class ATSPIManager:
    _instance = None
    def __new__(cls):
        if not cls._instance:
            cls._instance = super().__new__(cls)
            Atspi.init()
        return cls._instance

Pattern 5: Scope Limiting (Reduce Search Space)

# BAD: Search entire desktop tree
result = search_recursive(Atspi.get_desktop(0), name)

# GOOD: Limit to specific app
app = get_application(app_name)
result = search_recursive(app, name)

# BETTER: Add role filtering
result = search_with_role(app, name, role=Atspi.Role.PUSH_BUTTON)

8. Security Standards

8.1 Critical Vulnerabilities

VulnerabilitySeverityMitigation
AT-SPI2 Registry Bypass (CWE-284)HIGHValidate through registry
D-Bus Session Hijacking (CVE-2022-42012)HIGHValidate D-Bus peer credentials
Password Field Access (CWE-200)CRITICALBlock PASSWORD_TEXT role
Input Injection (CWE-74)HIGHApplication blocklists
Event Flooding (CWE-400)MEDIUMRate limiting, event filtering

8.2 Permission Tier Model

PERMISSION_TIERS = {
    'read-only': {
        'allowed_operations': ['get_name', 'get_role', 'get_state', 'find'],
        'blocked_roles': [Atspi.Role.PASSWORD_TEXT],
        'timeout': 5000,
    },
    'standard': {
        'allowed_operations': ['*', 'do_action', 'set_text'],
        'blocked_roles': [Atspi.Role.PASSWORD_TEXT],
        'timeout': 10000,
    },
    'elevated': {
        'allowed_operations': ['*'],
        'blocked_apps': ['polkit', 'gnome-keyring'],
        'timeout': 30000,
    }
}

9. Common Mistakes

Never: Access Password Fields

# BAD: No role check
value = obj.get_text().get_text(0, -1)

# GOOD: Check role first
if obj.get_role() != Atspi.Role.PASSWORD_TEXT:
    value = obj.get_text().get_text(0, -1)

Never: Skip Application Validation

# BAD: Direct access
app = desktop.get_child_at_index(0)
interact(app)

# GOOD: Validate first
if is_allowed_app(app.get_name()):
    interact(app)

10. Pre-Implementation Checklist

Phase 1: Before Writing Code

  • Reviewed AT-SPI2 security patterns in this skill
  • Identified target applications and verified not in blocklist
  • Determined required permission tier (read-only/standard/elevated)
  • Wrote failing tests for security validations
  • Planned caching strategy for node lookups

Phase 2: During Implementation

  • Implemented application blocklist checks
  • Added PASSWORD_TEXT role blocking
  • Enforced timeouts on all D-Bus calls
  • Applied node caching for performance
  • Used event filtering (not wildcard subscriptions)
  • Implemented scope limiting for searches

Phase 3: Before Committing

  • All pytest tests pass with coverage > 80%
  • Audit logging verified for all operations
  • Rate limiting tested under load
  • No security warnings in test output
  • Performance verified (< 100ms for element lookups)

11. Summary

Your goal is to create AT-SPI2 automation that is:

  • Secure: Application validation, role blocking, audit logging
  • Reliable: Timeout enforcement, error handling
  • Accessible: Respects assistive technology boundaries

Security Reminders:

  1. Always block access to PASSWORD_TEXT roles
  2. Validate applications before automation
  3. Enforce timeouts on all D-Bus calls
  4. Log all operations for audit
  5. Use appropriate permission tiers

References

  • See references/security-examples.md
  • See references/threat-model.md
  • See references/advanced-patterns.md

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